appeal that the recorder should not have used the expression ‘a substantial cause’, but should have directed the jury in accordance with the test in Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95. Held: (1) The case was on all fours with Hennigan (considered below). In that case it was said that the expression ‘a substantial cause’ was convenient to indicate to the jury that the cause must have been more than just de minimis, which was the only necessary qualification. It also avoided the necessity to go into the details of legal causation and remoteness. (2) The test set out in Roberts (considered below: was the injury the natural result of what the assailant said and did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying and doing?) did not invalidate the simple direction given by the trial judge in that case (was the harm ‘as a result’ of the assailant’s act?). The test in Roberts is not one always to be applied and about which there should always be a direction. What constitutes a ‘substantial’ cause?

DOI link for appeal that the recorder should not have used the expression ‘a substantial cause’, but should have directed the jury in accordance with the test in Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95. Held: (1) The case was on all fours with Hennigan (considered below). In that case it was said that the expression ‘a substantial cause’ was convenient to indicate to the jury that the cause must have been more than just de minimis, which was the only necessary qualification. It also avoided the necessity to go into the details of legal causation and remoteness. (2) The test set out in Roberts (considered below: was the injury the natural result of what the assailant said and did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying and doing?) did not invalidate the simple direction given by the trial judge in that case (was the harm ‘as a result’ of the assailant’s act?). The test in Roberts is not one always to be applied and about which there should always be a direction. What constitutes a ‘substantial’ cause?

appeal that the recorder should not have used the expression ‘a substantial cause’, but should have directed the jury in accordance with the test in Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95. Held: (1) The case was on all fours with Hennigan (considered below). In that case it was said that the expression ‘a substantial cause’ was convenient to indicate to the jury that the cause must have been more than just de minimis, which was the only necessary qualification. It also avoided the necessity to go into the details of legal causation and remoteness. (2) The test set out in Roberts (considered below: was the injury the natural result of what the assailant said and did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying and doing?) did not invalidate the simple direction given by the trial judge in that case (was the harm ‘as a result’ of the assailant’s act?). The test in Roberts is not one always to be applied and about which there should always be a direction. What constitutes a ‘substantial’ cause?