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R v Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving. A close friend of the appellant overtook him and the two engaged in a high-speed chase with the appellant driving a few feet from the rear of his friend’s car. Both cars had just overtaken another car at 75 mph, when the friend’s car swerved on to the verge. The prosecution evidence was that the appellant overtook his friend at that point and struck her car, either because she swerved back to the right, or because he pulled to the left as he overtook. The friend, not in control of her car, struck an oncoming car, and was killed. One of her tyres was underinflated, which could have led to the car being difficult to control. The appellant’s case was that the friend had lost control before his car hit hers and the first collision did not have any effect on her loss of control, which in turn led to the second, fatal collision. The prosecution case was that the appellant’s driving had caused the friend’s loss of control and the first collision, which in turn led to the fatal collision, or alternatively that his driving encouraged her to drive too fast and lose control; or that by driving so closely behind, when she did lose control, the first collision occurred, occasioning further loss of control. The recorder told the jury that they did not have to be sure that the appellant’s driving ‘was the principal, or a substantial, cause of the death, as long as you are sure that it was a cause and that there was something more than a slight or a trifling link’. On appeal, it was argued that it was wrong to say that the cause did not have to be a substantial cause. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the test in Hennigan (1971) 55 Cr App R 262 was whether the contribution of the dangerous driving to the death was more than minute. To use the expression ‘a substantial cause’ is no doubt a convenient way of putting the test to the jury, as was suggested in that case. But the jury may well give the word ‘substantial’ a larger meaning. The recorder’s reference to a ‘slight or trifling link’ was a permissible and useful way to avoid the term de minimis. His direction was faithful to the logic of Hennigan. NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIENS – CAN THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION BE BROKEN BY THE ACTIONS OF THE VICTIM? Refusing medical treatment
DOI link for R v Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving. A close friend of the appellant overtook him and the two engaged in a high-speed chase with the appellant driving a few feet from the rear of his friend’s car. Both cars had just overtaken another car at 75 mph, when the friend’s car swerved on to the verge. The prosecution evidence was that the appellant overtook his friend at that point and struck her car, either because she swerved back to the right, or because he pulled to the left as he overtook. The friend, not in control of her car, struck an oncoming car, and was killed. One of her tyres was underinflated, which could have led to the car being difficult to control. The appellant’s case was that the friend had lost control before his car hit hers and the first collision did not have any effect on her loss of control, which in turn led to the second, fatal collision. The prosecution case was that the appellant’s driving had caused the friend’s loss of control and the first collision, which in turn led to the fatal collision, or alternatively that his driving encouraged her to drive too fast and lose control; or that by driving so closely behind, when she did lose control, the first collision occurred, occasioning further loss of control. The recorder told the jury that they did not have to be sure that the appellant’s driving ‘was the principal, or a substantial, cause of the death, as long as you are sure that it was a cause and that there was something more than a slight or a trifling link’. On appeal, it was argued that it was wrong to say that the cause did not have to be a substantial cause. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the test in Hennigan (1971) 55 Cr App R 262 was whether the contribution of the dangerous driving to the death was more than minute. To use the expression ‘a substantial cause’ is no doubt a convenient way of putting the test to the jury, as was suggested in that case. But the jury may well give the word ‘substantial’ a larger meaning. The recorder’s reference to a ‘slight or trifling link’ was a permissible and useful way to avoid the term de minimis. His direction was faithful to the logic of Hennigan. NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIENS – CAN THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION BE BROKEN BY THE ACTIONS OF THE VICTIM? Refusing medical treatment
R v Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving. A close friend of the appellant overtook him and the two engaged in a high-speed chase with the appellant driving a few feet from the rear of his friend’s car. Both cars had just overtaken another car at 75 mph, when the friend’s car swerved on to the verge. The prosecution evidence was that the appellant overtook his friend at that point and struck her car, either because she swerved back to the right, or because he pulled to the left as he overtook. The friend, not in control of her car, struck an oncoming car, and was killed. One of her tyres was underinflated, which could have led to the car being difficult to control. The appellant’s case was that the friend had lost control before his car hit hers and the first collision did not have any effect on her loss of control, which in turn led to the second, fatal collision. The prosecution case was that the appellant’s driving had caused the friend’s loss of control and the first collision, which in turn led to the fatal collision, or alternatively that his driving encouraged her to drive too fast and lose control; or that by driving so closely behind, when she did lose control, the first collision occurred, occasioning further loss of control. The recorder told the jury that they did not have to be sure that the appellant’s driving ‘was the principal, or a substantial, cause of the death, as long as you are sure that it was a cause and that there was something more than a slight or a trifling link’. On appeal, it was argued that it was wrong to say that the cause did not have to be a substantial cause. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the test in Hennigan (1971) 55 Cr App R 262 was whether the contribution of the dangerous driving to the death was more than minute. To use the expression ‘a substantial cause’ is no doubt a convenient way of putting the test to the jury, as was suggested in that case. But the jury may well give the word ‘substantial’ a larger meaning. The recorder’s reference to a ‘slight or trifling link’ was a permissible and useful way to avoid the term de minimis. His direction was faithful to the logic of Hennigan. NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIENS – CAN THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION BE BROKEN BY THE ACTIONS OF THE VICTIM? Refusing medical treatment
ABSTRACT
Towards the end of the trial and before the summing up started counsel on both sides made submissions as to how the case should be put to the jury. Counsel then appearing for the appellant invited the judge to direct the jury to acquit the appellant generally on the count of murder. His argument was that the girl’s refusal to have a blood transfusion had broken the chain of causation between the stabbing and her death. As an alternative he submitted that the jury should be left to decide whether the chain of causation had been broken. Counsel for the Crown submitted that the judge should direct the jury to convict, because no facts were in issue and when the law was applied to the facts there was only one possible verdict, ie manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility ...
