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obvious risk that property would be damaged and that life would thereby be endangered? The ordinary prudent bystander is not deemed to be invested with expert knowledge relating to the construction of the property, nor to have the benefit of hindsight. The time at which his perception is material is the time when the fire is started.’ 4 Why is a man who drives his car whilst distracted by the sight of a ‘pretty girl’ (see R v Reid) not reckless? 5 Parliament has since replaced the offence of causing death by reckless driving with the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. What is the significance of the substitution of the word ‘dangerous’ for ‘reckless’? Will it make convictions easier to come by? Does it make clear that the fault element is totally objective? Does it suggest that the House of Lords in Lawrence was trying to achieve a laudable result by the wrong means (that is, judicial activism to bring careless drivers within the scope of the offence of reckless driving)? 6 It seems fair to assume that Lord Diplock was attempting, in Caldwell and Lawrence, to send out a message that failure to advert to an obvious risk could give rise to criminal liability. Is there any deterrent effect to such decisions? Do members of the general public know about these rulings? If so do they alter their behaviour as a result, or are defendants only aware of the scope of recklessness when they find themselves convicted of offences where Caldwell applies? 7 Significantly, Caldwell recklessness has now effectively been confined to the offence of criminal damage. In W (A Minor) v Dolbey (1989) 88 Cr App R 1 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (on the issue of whether or not the Lawrence (1981) and Caldwell (1981) approach to recklessness was appropriate in relation to offences that could be committed ‘maliciously’ such as malicious wounding contrary to s 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861) observed:
DOI link for obvious risk that property would be damaged and that life would thereby be endangered? The ordinary prudent bystander is not deemed to be invested with expert knowledge relating to the construction of the property, nor to have the benefit of hindsight. The time at which his perception is material is the time when the fire is started.’ 4 Why is a man who drives his car whilst distracted by the sight of a ‘pretty girl’ (see R v Reid) not reckless? 5 Parliament has since replaced the offence of causing death by reckless driving with the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. What is the significance of the substitution of the word ‘dangerous’ for ‘reckless’? Will it make convictions easier to come by? Does it make clear that the fault element is totally objective? Does it suggest that the House of Lords in Lawrence was trying to achieve a laudable result by the wrong means (that is, judicial activism to bring careless drivers within the scope of the offence of reckless driving)? 6 It seems fair to assume that Lord Diplock was attempting, in Caldwell and Lawrence, to send out a message that failure to advert to an obvious risk could give rise to criminal liability. Is there any deterrent effect to such decisions? Do members of the general public know about these rulings? If so do they alter their behaviour as a result, or are defendants only aware of the scope of recklessness when they find themselves convicted of offences where Caldwell applies? 7 Significantly, Caldwell recklessness has now effectively been confined to the offence of criminal damage. In W (A Minor) v Dolbey (1989) 88 Cr App R 1 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (on the issue of whether or not the Lawrence (1981) and Caldwell (1981) approach to recklessness was appropriate in relation to offences that could be committed ‘maliciously’ such as malicious wounding contrary to s 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861) observed:
obvious risk that property would be damaged and that life would thereby be endangered? The ordinary prudent bystander is not deemed to be invested with expert knowledge relating to the construction of the property, nor to have the benefit of hindsight. The time at which his perception is material is the time when the fire is started.’ 4 Why is a man who drives his car whilst distracted by the sight of a ‘pretty girl’ (see R v Reid) not reckless? 5 Parliament has since replaced the offence of causing death by reckless driving with the offence of causing death by dangerous driving. What is the significance of the substitution of the word ‘dangerous’ for ‘reckless’? Will it make convictions easier to come by? Does it make clear that the fault element is totally objective? Does it suggest that the House of Lords in Lawrence was trying to achieve a laudable result by the wrong means (that is, judicial activism to bring careless drivers within the scope of the offence of reckless driving)? 6 It seems fair to assume that Lord Diplock was attempting, in Caldwell and Lawrence, to send out a message that failure to advert to an obvious risk could give rise to criminal liability. Is there any deterrent effect to such decisions? Do members of the general public know about these rulings? If so do they alter their behaviour as a result, or are defendants only aware of the scope of recklessness when they find themselves convicted of offences where Caldwell applies? 7 Significantly, Caldwell recklessness has now effectively been confined to the offence of criminal damage. In W (A Minor) v Dolbey (1989) 88 Cr App R 1 (DC), Robert Goff LJ (on the issue of whether or not the Lawrence (1981) and Caldwell (1981) approach to recklessness was appropriate in relation to offences that could be committed ‘maliciously’ such as malicious wounding contrary to s 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861) observed:
ABSTRACT