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In practice it will be for the jury to determine whether the weapon used by the principal is sufficiently different from that contemplated by the accomplice for there to be a departure from the joint enterprise, but it can be imagined how difficulties might arise where, for example, the agreement is to hit the victim with bare fists and the principal kicks him whilst wearing steel-capped boots. Are the boots a fundamentally different type of weapon? 5 P may use the weapon contemplated by A, and with intent contemplated by A, but in a way that causes more life threatening injuries than those contemplated by A. For example A and P agree that P will attack V with a baseball bat and cause grievous bodily harm by breaking P’s arms. In the event P attacks V with the baseball bat, intending to cause V grievous bodily harm, by striking V on the head. V dies from his injuries. P may be convicted of murder, and A (in theory) could be convicted as an accomplice, given his mens rea. Can it not be argued, however, in the light of Gamble (see above) that by choosing to attack V and causing more life threatening GBH, P deliberately departed from the common design? See further R v Bamborough [1996] Crim LR 744, where the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that it would be sufficient, in order to substantiate A’s conviction for murder as an accomplice, that he had contemplated grievous bodily harm as a possible incident of the common design, the court not being overly concerned at how A might have foreseen the grievous bodily harm being caused by P. Residual liability for manslaughter where the principal is convicted of murder
DOI link for In practice it will be for the jury to determine whether the weapon used by the principal is sufficiently different from that contemplated by the accomplice for there to be a departure from the joint enterprise, but it can be imagined how difficulties might arise where, for example, the agreement is to hit the victim with bare fists and the principal kicks him whilst wearing steel-capped boots. Are the boots a fundamentally different type of weapon? 5 P may use the weapon contemplated by A, and with intent contemplated by A, but in a way that causes more life threatening injuries than those contemplated by A. For example A and P agree that P will attack V with a baseball bat and cause grievous bodily harm by breaking P’s arms. In the event P attacks V with the baseball bat, intending to cause V grievous bodily harm, by striking V on the head. V dies from his injuries. P may be convicted of murder, and A (in theory) could be convicted as an accomplice, given his mens rea. Can it not be argued, however, in the light of Gamble (see above) that by choosing to attack V and causing more life threatening GBH, P deliberately departed from the common design? See further R v Bamborough [1996] Crim LR 744, where the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that it would be sufficient, in order to substantiate A’s conviction for murder as an accomplice, that he had contemplated grievous bodily harm as a possible incident of the common design, the court not being overly concerned at how A might have foreseen the grievous bodily harm being caused by P. Residual liability for manslaughter where the principal is convicted of murder
In practice it will be for the jury to determine whether the weapon used by the principal is sufficiently different from that contemplated by the accomplice for there to be a departure from the joint enterprise, but it can be imagined how difficulties might arise where, for example, the agreement is to hit the victim with bare fists and the principal kicks him whilst wearing steel-capped boots. Are the boots a fundamentally different type of weapon? 5 P may use the weapon contemplated by A, and with intent contemplated by A, but in a way that causes more life threatening injuries than those contemplated by A. For example A and P agree that P will attack V with a baseball bat and cause grievous bodily harm by breaking P’s arms. In the event P attacks V with the baseball bat, intending to cause V grievous bodily harm, by striking V on the head. V dies from his injuries. P may be convicted of murder, and A (in theory) could be convicted as an accomplice, given his mens rea. Can it not be argued, however, in the light of Gamble (see above) that by choosing to attack V and causing more life threatening GBH, P deliberately departed from the common design? See further R v Bamborough [1996] Crim LR 744, where the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that it would be sufficient, in order to substantiate A’s conviction for murder as an accomplice, that he had contemplated grievous bodily harm as a possible incident of the common design, the court not being overly concerned at how A might have foreseen the grievous bodily harm being caused by P. Residual liability for manslaughter where the principal is convicted of murder
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