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were accepted by the jury the court was far from confident that the appellant, by his words and actions, had effectively put an end to the joint enterprise so that he had no criminal responsibility for what happened after the three stab wounds which he inflicted. The words ‘I’m not doing it’ and the turning around and moving a few feet away were far from unequivocal notice that the appellant was wholly disassociating himself from the entire enterprise. The words were quite capable of meaning no more than ‘I will not myself strike any more blows’. They were not an unequivocal indication that he did not intend to take any further part in any further assault on Sam and indeed he did no more than withdraw by a few feet (see Becerra (1976) 62 Cr App R 212; Rook [1993] 1 WLR 1005). Notes and queries 1 In R v Mitchell [1999] Crim LR 496, the Court of Appeal held that a distinction was to be drawn between pre-planned and spontaneous violence, in the sense that where violence was pre-planned, communication of withdrawal from the planned violence was necessary for that withdrawal to be effective. Where the violence was spontaneous communication of the intention to withdraw was not necessarily required. Is this distinction justifiable? CODIFICATION AND LAW REFORM PROPOSALS
DOI link for were accepted by the jury the court was far from confident that the appellant, by his words and actions, had effectively put an end to the joint enterprise so that he had no criminal responsibility for what happened after the three stab wounds which he inflicted. The words ‘I’m not doing it’ and the turning around and moving a few feet away were far from unequivocal notice that the appellant was wholly disassociating himself from the entire enterprise. The words were quite capable of meaning no more than ‘I will not myself strike any more blows’. They were not an unequivocal indication that he did not intend to take any further part in any further assault on Sam and indeed he did no more than withdraw by a few feet (see Becerra (1976) 62 Cr App R 212; Rook [1993] 1 WLR 1005). Notes and queries 1 In R v Mitchell [1999] Crim LR 496, the Court of Appeal held that a distinction was to be drawn between pre-planned and spontaneous violence, in the sense that where violence was pre-planned, communication of withdrawal from the planned violence was necessary for that withdrawal to be effective. Where the violence was spontaneous communication of the intention to withdraw was not necessarily required. Is this distinction justifiable? CODIFICATION AND LAW REFORM PROPOSALS
were accepted by the jury the court was far from confident that the appellant, by his words and actions, had effectively put an end to the joint enterprise so that he had no criminal responsibility for what happened after the three stab wounds which he inflicted. The words ‘I’m not doing it’ and the turning around and moving a few feet away were far from unequivocal notice that the appellant was wholly disassociating himself from the entire enterprise. The words were quite capable of meaning no more than ‘I will not myself strike any more blows’. They were not an unequivocal indication that he did not intend to take any further part in any further assault on Sam and indeed he did no more than withdraw by a few feet (see Becerra (1976) 62 Cr App R 212; Rook [1993] 1 WLR 1005). Notes and queries 1 In R v Mitchell [1999] Crim LR 496, the Court of Appeal held that a distinction was to be drawn between pre-planned and spontaneous violence, in the sense that where violence was pre-planned, communication of withdrawal from the planned violence was necessary for that withdrawal to be effective. Where the violence was spontaneous communication of the intention to withdraw was not necessarily required. Is this distinction justifiable? CODIFICATION AND LAW REFORM PROPOSALS
ABSTRACT
Two kinds of actions render the secondary party liable for the criminal actions of the primary party: intentionally influencing the decision of the primary party to commit a crime, and intentionally helping the principal actor commit the crime, where the helping actions themselves constitute no part of the actions prohibited by the definition of the crime ...