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and it was not considered that Lord Taylor CJ intended to throw any doubt on the general rule which presently applied to cases of provocation and duress that the application of the objective test was a matter for the jury (see the speech of Lord Simon in Camplin [1978] AC 705). The medical evidence was not admissible as the law stood on the objective test in a case of duress. Further, as that test predicated a ‘sober person of reasonable firmness’ there was no scope for attributing to that hypothetical person as one of the characteristics of the defendant a pre-existing mental condition of being ‘emotionally unstable’ or in a ‘grossly elevated neurotic state’. That left consideration of whether the position would have been different had ‘duress by circumstances’ been asserted. It was plain from Martin that an objective test applied, and one of the questions to be addressed was whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the accused’s characteristics, would have responded to the situation confronting him by acting as he did. The medical evidence in this case did not address that question. The judge was right to exclude it as inadmissible. R v Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted on four counts of possession of drugs with intent. His defence was duress. He was addicted to crack cocaine and owed his supplier £1,500. Some 17 hours before the police searched his flat, the drug dealer told him to look after the drugs found, saying that if he did not, he would shoot the appellant’s mother, grandmother and girlfriend. On appeal, it was argued that the judge should have told the jury that, in assessing the response of the hypothetical person of reasonable firmness to the threats, they should have invested that person with the characteristic of being a drug addict. Held, dismissing the appeal, that drug addiction was a self-induced condition, not a characteristic. There was no evidence that the appellant’s addiction (or indeed that of anyone else) would have had an effect on a person’s ability to withstand a threat from a drugs dealer. It was not sought to adduce psychiatric or other evidence to say that the appellant’s ability to withstand threats was in any way weakened. It may well be that he felt under some obligation to look after the supplier’s drugs. R v Bowen [1997] 1 WLR 372 (CA)
DOI link for and it was not considered that Lord Taylor CJ intended to throw any doubt on the general rule which presently applied to cases of provocation and duress that the application of the objective test was a matter for the jury (see the speech of Lord Simon in Camplin [1978] AC 705). The medical evidence was not admissible as the law stood on the objective test in a case of duress. Further, as that test predicated a ‘sober person of reasonable firmness’ there was no scope for attributing to that hypothetical person as one of the characteristics of the defendant a pre-existing mental condition of being ‘emotionally unstable’ or in a ‘grossly elevated neurotic state’. That left consideration of whether the position would have been different had ‘duress by circumstances’ been asserted. It was plain from Martin that an objective test applied, and one of the questions to be addressed was whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the accused’s characteristics, would have responded to the situation confronting him by acting as he did. The medical evidence in this case did not address that question. The judge was right to exclude it as inadmissible. R v Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted on four counts of possession of drugs with intent. His defence was duress. He was addicted to crack cocaine and owed his supplier £1,500. Some 17 hours before the police searched his flat, the drug dealer told him to look after the drugs found, saying that if he did not, he would shoot the appellant’s mother, grandmother and girlfriend. On appeal, it was argued that the judge should have told the jury that, in assessing the response of the hypothetical person of reasonable firmness to the threats, they should have invested that person with the characteristic of being a drug addict. Held, dismissing the appeal, that drug addiction was a self-induced condition, not a characteristic. There was no evidence that the appellant’s addiction (or indeed that of anyone else) would have had an effect on a person’s ability to withstand a threat from a drugs dealer. It was not sought to adduce psychiatric or other evidence to say that the appellant’s ability to withstand threats was in any way weakened. It may well be that he felt under some obligation to look after the supplier’s drugs. R v Bowen [1997] 1 WLR 372 (CA)
and it was not considered that Lord Taylor CJ intended to throw any doubt on the general rule which presently applied to cases of provocation and duress that the application of the objective test was a matter for the jury (see the speech of Lord Simon in Camplin [1978] AC 705). The medical evidence was not admissible as the law stood on the objective test in a case of duress. Further, as that test predicated a ‘sober person of reasonable firmness’ there was no scope for attributing to that hypothetical person as one of the characteristics of the defendant a pre-existing mental condition of being ‘emotionally unstable’ or in a ‘grossly elevated neurotic state’. That left consideration of whether the position would have been different had ‘duress by circumstances’ been asserted. It was plain from Martin that an objective test applied, and one of the questions to be addressed was whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the accused’s characteristics, would have responded to the situation confronting him by acting as he did. The medical evidence in this case did not address that question. The judge was right to exclude it as inadmissible. R v Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576 (CA) Facts: The appellant was convicted on four counts of possession of drugs with intent. His defence was duress. He was addicted to crack cocaine and owed his supplier £1,500. Some 17 hours before the police searched his flat, the drug dealer told him to look after the drugs found, saying that if he did not, he would shoot the appellant’s mother, grandmother and girlfriend. On appeal, it was argued that the judge should have told the jury that, in assessing the response of the hypothetical person of reasonable firmness to the threats, they should have invested that person with the characteristic of being a drug addict. Held, dismissing the appeal, that drug addiction was a self-induced condition, not a characteristic. There was no evidence that the appellant’s addiction (or indeed that of anyone else) would have had an effect on a person’s ability to withstand a threat from a drugs dealer. It was not sought to adduce psychiatric or other evidence to say that the appellant’s ability to withstand threats was in any way weakened. It may well be that he felt under some obligation to look after the supplier’s drugs. R v Bowen [1997] 1 WLR 372 (CA)
ABSTRACT
Stuart-Smith LJ: On 2 August 1995 in the Crown Court at Luton the appellant was convicted of five counts of obtaining services by deception. He was subsequently sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, concurrent on each count. He now appeals against his convictions with leave of the single judge.