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Notes and queries 1 What is the difference between inferring intention and finding intention? 2 What is to be made of Lord Steyn’s observation that he approached the issues arising on the appeal ‘on the basis that it does not follow that “intent” necessarily has precisely the same meaning in every context in the criminal law’? Does he mean that some offences require ‘purpose’ type intent? Or does he mean that intent might have a different meaning when used, for example, in the context of offences against the person? Is it conceivable that intent, in the context of intention to do grievous bodily harm contrary to s 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (see further Chapter 16), would have a different meaning to that enunciated in Woollin? Given that intent to do grievous bodily harm will suffice for murder this (one hopes) seems unlikely. Codification and law reform proposals
DOI link for Notes and queries 1 What is the difference between inferring intention and finding intention? 2 What is to be made of Lord Steyn’s observation that he approached the issues arising on the appeal ‘on the basis that it does not follow that “intent” necessarily has precisely the same meaning in every context in the criminal law’? Does he mean that some offences require ‘purpose’ type intent? Or does he mean that intent might have a different meaning when used, for example, in the context of offences against the person? Is it conceivable that intent, in the context of intention to do grievous bodily harm contrary to s 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (see further Chapter 16), would have a different meaning to that enunciated in Woollin? Given that intent to do grievous bodily harm will suffice for murder this (one hopes) seems unlikely. Codification and law reform proposals
Notes and queries 1 What is the difference between inferring intention and finding intention? 2 What is to be made of Lord Steyn’s observation that he approached the issues arising on the appeal ‘on the basis that it does not follow that “intent” necessarily has precisely the same meaning in every context in the criminal law’? Does he mean that some offences require ‘purpose’ type intent? Or does he mean that intent might have a different meaning when used, for example, in the context of offences against the person? Is it conceivable that intent, in the context of intention to do grievous bodily harm contrary to s 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (see further Chapter 16), would have a different meaning to that enunciated in Woollin? Given that intent to do grievous bodily harm will suffice for murder this (one hopes) seems unlikely. Codification and law reform proposals
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