cable had been left entirely exposed for a period of six minutes. He did not believe there was any risk of endangering life at any stage, and he would not have undertaken the work if he had not been competent to do so. The judge ruled that as a matter of law, any precautions designed to eliminate the risk of endangering life must, to provide a defence, be taken before the damage was caused. As a result of the ruling the appellant changed his plea to guilty. On appeal, it was argued that the defendant fell outside the definition of recklessness set out in Caldwell [1982] AC 341. He had not failed to consider the risk (he had thought about it), and nor had he acted recognising the existence of a risk (he had decided there was no risk). Counsel relied on Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset v Shimmen (1987) 84 Cr App R 7. Held, dismissing the appeal, there is a clear distinction between avoiding a risk and taking steps to remedy a risk which has already been created. If a defendant is to successfully contend that the taking of certain steps has prevented him from falling within the definition of recklessness, then those steps must be directed towards preventing the risk at all, rather than at remedying it once it has arisen. The appellant accepted that he had created a risk by exposing the cable, and that it remained exposed for six minutes. Although he said he took reasonable precautions to eliminate the danger, by then he was inevitably remedying a risk that he had already created rather than preventing the risk which arose when the live wire was exposed. R v Reid [1992] 1 WLR 793 (HL)

ABSTRACT

Lord Goff of Chieveley: ... It has been pointed out that, although Lord Diplock’s two categories of recklessness taken together have the effect that, in most cases where the defendant is driving dangerously in the sense I have described, he will in fact be driving recklessly, nevertheless there are cases in which this is not so. This may occur where the defendant considers the possibility of risk but nevertheless concludes that there is none. But we have to remember that, ex hypothesi, the defendant is driving dangerously in the sense I have described; and in practice his evidence that in such circumstances he thought that there was no risk is only likely to carry weight if he can point to some specific fact as to which he was mistaken and which, if true, would have excluded the possibility of risk which might occur if, for example, as my noble and learned friend Lord Ackner has pointed out, he misunderstood in good faith some direction or instruction, or if he drove the wrong way down a one-way street at a normal speed in the mistaken belief that it was a two-way street. If that was indeed the case, his driving might well not be described as reckless, though such cases are likely to be rare. It has been suggested that there is therefore a ‘loophole’ or ‘lacuna’ in Lord Diplock’s definition of recklessness. I feel bound to say that I myself regard these expressions as misleading. The simple fact is that Lord Diplock was concerned to define driving recklessly, not dangerous driving; and it is not in every case where the defendant is in fact driving dangerously that he should be held to be driving recklessly, although in most cases the two will coincide. Another example where they may not coincide would occur where a driver who, while driving, is afflicted by illness or shock which impairs his capacity to address his mind to the possibility of risk; it may well not be right to describe him as driving recklessly in

such circumstances. Likewise (as my noble and learned friend has pointed out), if a driver takes evasive action in an emergency, his action may involve the taking of a risk which is regarded as justified in the special circumstances, so that he cannot be described as driving recklessly. Such cases, which again are likely to be rare, can be dealt with if and when they arise. It is however unnecessary to consider any such case on the present appeal.