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from hypoglycaemia and was unaware of his actions. The judge refused to leave that defence to the jury. Held, allowing the appeal, the arguments put to the judge failed to distinguish between hyperglycaemia and hypoglycaemia, the former being too much sugar in the blood, and the latter too little. Hyperglycaemia might raise difficult problems about the M’Naghten Rules and verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity. Hypoglycaemia was not caused by the initial disease of diabetes, but by the treatment in the form of too much insulin, or by insufficient quality or quantity of food to counterbalance the insulin. Generally speaking, that would not give rise to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity but would, if it were established and showed that the necessary intent was or might be lacking, provide a satisfactory defence to an alleged crime such as theft, due to lack of mens rea. Those simple facts would be plain to anyone who troubled to read Quick (1973) 57 Cr App R and Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287. In the present case, the problem was hypoglycaemia and the judge had to decide whether, on the evidence, there was a prima facie case for the jury to decide whether the defendant was suffering from its effects and, if so, whether the Crown had shown that he had the necessary intent under the Theft Act. It was not doubted that the defendant was a diabetic and there was evidence that he might have been suffering from the effects of a low blood sugar level at the relevant time. That evidence should have been left to the jury. Notes and queries 1 In RvT [1990] Crim LR 256, the court accepted evidence that post-traumatic stress disorder could give rise to automatism. By contrast, in R v Sandie Smith [1982] Crim LR 531, evidence of severe pre-menstrual tension was not accepted as giving rise to automatism. Aside from the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of automatism in the latter case, the determining factor was the court’s desire to exercise some jurisdiction over the accused. If a plea of automatism is successful the defendant is free to go – the courts cannot compel him or her to receive treatment for the condition giving rise to the automatism. Self-induced automatism
DOI link for from hypoglycaemia and was unaware of his actions. The judge refused to leave that defence to the jury. Held, allowing the appeal, the arguments put to the judge failed to distinguish between hyperglycaemia and hypoglycaemia, the former being too much sugar in the blood, and the latter too little. Hyperglycaemia might raise difficult problems about the M’Naghten Rules and verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity. Hypoglycaemia was not caused by the initial disease of diabetes, but by the treatment in the form of too much insulin, or by insufficient quality or quantity of food to counterbalance the insulin. Generally speaking, that would not give rise to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity but would, if it were established and showed that the necessary intent was or might be lacking, provide a satisfactory defence to an alleged crime such as theft, due to lack of mens rea. Those simple facts would be plain to anyone who troubled to read Quick (1973) 57 Cr App R and Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287. In the present case, the problem was hypoglycaemia and the judge had to decide whether, on the evidence, there was a prima facie case for the jury to decide whether the defendant was suffering from its effects and, if so, whether the Crown had shown that he had the necessary intent under the Theft Act. It was not doubted that the defendant was a diabetic and there was evidence that he might have been suffering from the effects of a low blood sugar level at the relevant time. That evidence should have been left to the jury. Notes and queries 1 In RvT [1990] Crim LR 256, the court accepted evidence that post-traumatic stress disorder could give rise to automatism. By contrast, in R v Sandie Smith [1982] Crim LR 531, evidence of severe pre-menstrual tension was not accepted as giving rise to automatism. Aside from the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of automatism in the latter case, the determining factor was the court’s desire to exercise some jurisdiction over the accused. If a plea of automatism is successful the defendant is free to go – the courts cannot compel him or her to receive treatment for the condition giving rise to the automatism. Self-induced automatism
from hypoglycaemia and was unaware of his actions. The judge refused to leave that defence to the jury. Held, allowing the appeal, the arguments put to the judge failed to distinguish between hyperglycaemia and hypoglycaemia, the former being too much sugar in the blood, and the latter too little. Hyperglycaemia might raise difficult problems about the M’Naghten Rules and verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity. Hypoglycaemia was not caused by the initial disease of diabetes, but by the treatment in the form of too much insulin, or by insufficient quality or quantity of food to counterbalance the insulin. Generally speaking, that would not give rise to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity but would, if it were established and showed that the necessary intent was or might be lacking, provide a satisfactory defence to an alleged crime such as theft, due to lack of mens rea. Those simple facts would be plain to anyone who troubled to read Quick (1973) 57 Cr App R and Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287. In the present case, the problem was hypoglycaemia and the judge had to decide whether, on the evidence, there was a prima facie case for the jury to decide whether the defendant was suffering from its effects and, if so, whether the Crown had shown that he had the necessary intent under the Theft Act. It was not doubted that the defendant was a diabetic and there was evidence that he might have been suffering from the effects of a low blood sugar level at the relevant time. That evidence should have been left to the jury. Notes and queries 1 In RvT [1990] Crim LR 256, the court accepted evidence that post-traumatic stress disorder could give rise to automatism. By contrast, in R v Sandie Smith [1982] Crim LR 531, evidence of severe pre-menstrual tension was not accepted as giving rise to automatism. Aside from the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of automatism in the latter case, the determining factor was the court’s desire to exercise some jurisdiction over the accused. If a plea of automatism is successful the defendant is free to go – the courts cannot compel him or her to receive treatment for the condition giving rise to the automatism. Self-induced automatism
ABSTRACT
Griffiths LJ: ... The appellant is a diabetic and has been so for some 30 years. He requires to take insulin to control his condition. His defence at the trial was that he was acting in a state of automatism caused by hypoglycaemia.
