ABSTRACT
Costello, John. The Pacific War (1981). Spector, Ronald H. Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan (1985). Winslow, W.G. The Fleet the Gods Forgot: The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in World War II
(1982). John E.Moser
SEE ALSO Navy, U.S.; Dutch East Indies
The China-Burma-India (CBI) theater saw the first extensive use of aerial resupply in modern warfare. The chief recipients of this innovation were the 2,997 men of the officially designated 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), more popularly known as “Merrill’s Marauders” after their commander, Brigadier General Frank D.Merrill. The unit’s mission was to conduct long-range penetrations behind enemy lines in Japanese-held Burma. The terrain of northern Burma presented major difficulties for the Marauders. In the far north, the Himalayas are virtually impassable, with peaks rising to 20,000 feet. On the Indian frontier, a continuous range runs southwest from the Himalayas along the Assam border in parallel ridges reaching heights of 10,000 feet. On the Chinese border, the Himalayas curve south to complete the threesided isolation of the region. This rugged hill country is further divided into two compartments by the northsouth Kumon Range, with elevations in excess of 10,000 feet. Additionally, Burma experiences a wet season from June to the end of September, which causes lowlands to be flooded to the extent that movement is greatly restricted. Add all this to the fact that northern Burma in 1944 was almost void of roads. Native footpaths and cart tracks provided the only means of communication in most of the area, and the only road suitable for motor traffic was itself unusable in the wet season. These environmental considerations rendered normal methods of resupply impractical for a highly mobile dismounted unit operating behind enemy lines, such as were Merrill’s Marauders. One innovative measure was to provide the force with 700 animals to be used as pack transport, but the ultimate source of the Marauder’s strategic mobility was aerial resupply. This technique had been used with success in 1943 by British Major General
Orde C.Wingate’s 77th Infantry Brigade under similar circumstances, and the Marauders would take advantage of several lessons learned. Among the prerequisites were the need for detailed planning, excellent radio communications, trained pilots, careful packaging of loads, and rapid response to requests. Air and ground forces would have to attain the closest of cooperation, and pilots would have to be willing to fly under almost all conditions. The Marauder’s need for food and ammunition could not always wait for good weather. In recognition of the importance of this type of resupply, Merrill established an aerial resupply section under the supervision of Major Edward T.Hancock. From his warehouses in Dinjan, Hancock was able to monitor all radio traffic to Merrill’s command headquarters 32 miles away at Ledo. Hancock prepared standard units of each category of supply based on estimated requirements for one day. These packages were always ready for delivery and could easily be adapted for specific needs. Initially, the 2d Troop Carrier Squadron and later the 1st Troop Carrier Squadron would fly the missions. Ammunition, medical supplies, and food were dropped by parachute from an altitude of 200 feet. Clothing and grain were dropped without parachute from 150 feet. The air force performed superbly, flying in all types of weather. In March 1944 alone, it flew seventeen missions and dropped 376 tons of supplies. The Marauders tried to plan their route so that they would be near a flat, open area suitable for a drop zone whenever a resupply was scheduled. This measure had two advantages: It saved the troops from the heavy labor of clearing a drop zone, and it enabled pilots to use aerial photographs and maps to identify destinations. The resupply packages came in easily manhandled bundles ranging from 115 to 125 pounds. From the drop zone, the bundles were loaded on mules and removed to a secure area for breakdown and distribution. Rations and ammunition were packaged for individual issue, and each man would file by to pick up his share. The standard procedure was to send back radio requests in the evening for supplies to be delivered the next afternoon. Major Hancock maintained a situation map to keep abreast of anticipated requirements, and his men were so responsive that ammunition was kept uploaded on trucks ready to dash to the airfield on a moment’s notice. Hancock’s performance zenith occurred on May 6, 1945, when a C-47 reached the drop area, 128 miles from Dinjan, just two hours and twenty-two minutes after the message had been filed in the field. The success of Merrill’s Marauders would have been impossible without the smooth operation of the aerial resupply network. There was close cooperation between the tacticians and the logisticians, and the latter were always responsive to the former’s needs. Hancock was capable of monitoring Merrill’s command communications, and he remained abreast of the situation on the ground. Packages were configured in standard loads, and the activities of the resupply party emphasized speed and security. For Merrill’s Marauders, aerial resupply was the only available means of logistical support, and their execution of this phase of their operation was nearly flawless.
