ABSTRACT
Introduction A defendant may wish to argue that, through intoxication, they were unable to control their actions and that therefore they were acting ‘involuntarily’. The courts’ response to this has been mixed, but they are generally reluctant to afford any defence to a person who voluntarily gets themselves drunk before committing a crime. This explains their response in some cases that ‘a drunken intent is nevertheless an intent’ (Sheehan and Moore (1975)). It is ironic that given the air of disapproval of drunkenness in the courts’ dicta on intoxication, the more drunk you are the more likely you are to have a defence. A number of cases have explored this issue. While it is a matter of degree in the circumstances of each case, the defendant is more likely to succeed with a defence if he is so drunk that his mind is incapable of forming mens rea (Stubbs (1989)), although this does not necessarily mean that the defendant has to be fully unconscious (Sooklal (Narine) v Trinidad and Tobago (1999)).
