ABSTRACT
What is most significant is that the court will have complete freedom to frame its remedy once it has found that an estoppel is both available and appropriate (Lord Cawdor v Lewis (1835)). Thus a two-stage process develops: first, find whether or not there is an estoppel and, secondly, decide on the most appropriate remedy in the context both in the light of the assurance made and the most effective method of compensating the claimant’s detriment. The remedies available can range from the award of the entire interest in the property at issue to a mere entitlement to equitable compensation. They may be enforceable not only against the person who made the assurance but also against third parties, thus underlining the proprietary nature of such remedies in circumstances where the court considers such a remedy appropriate (Hopgood v Brown (1955)). This indicates the nature of estoppel as a pure form of equity: the court is entirely at liberty to grant personal or proprietary awards which operate only against the defendant or also against third parties (as proprietary rights ought to).
