ABSTRACT
Some of the examples of irrelevance cited in chapters 1, 2, and 3 presented a special problem because they involved an institutional framework containing rules of relevance. Some were legal arguments. As noted in chapter 1, the FRE sets down rules of relevance that must be followed in a trial in Anglo-American law. Others were arguments from legislative debates, governed by rules of order, maintained by the Speaker of the House. In such debates, there are institutional requirements that govern who can speak and what they can say. There are even rules of relevance in the rules of order. As students or practitioners of logic, or argumentation theory, we are not necessarily in a position to know such rules, or be expected to apply them, when we evaluate an argument for relevance. On the other hand, the logic textbooks intend relevance to be applicable precisely to these kinds of cases of political deliberation and debate. It is clearly a big asset of any theory of relevance that it is at least potentially applicable to such cases.
