ABSTRACT
A strong assumption of universalism characterizes psychological theories of moral development within the social constructivist tradition of cognitive developmental theory (e.g., Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969, 1971) and the distinct domain perspective (e.g., Turiel, 1983, 1988a). It is assumed that stances that treat morality in culturally variable terms give rise to an extreme moral relativism and embody a passive view of the individual, as merely conforming to social expectations. This charge was initially directed by social constructivist theorists (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; Turiel, 1983) at social learning approaches (e.g., Berkowitz, 1964; Eysenck, 1961), perspectives that draw no distinction between morality and social convention. However, more recently, the same criticism (e.g., Turiel, 2002) has been directed at approaches to moral development within cultural psychology (e.g., Miller, 1994; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987), a perspective that, in contrast to social learning approaches, treats morality as based on a perceived natural law rather than on compliance with societal standards or personal preferences. Cultural psychological approaches to moral development are further criticized (e.g., Turiel & Wainryb, 2000) as being informed by stereotypical views of culture and embodying an insensitivity to contextual considerations.
