ABSTRACT
Professor Mattick is unnecessarily apologetic on behalf of his profession and colleagues. There is much to be said for a high degree of self-conscious organization of thought-especially when it illuminates a domain not well explored by others. As behavioral scientists we are quite used to refining ambiguous constructs operationally and resolving theoretical contradic-tions empirically. It is precisely when we enter the realm of values and ethics that we are largely left in the lurch by the scientific method and must call on the “general wisdom” and the “musings on morality” by philosophers to help us light the way. For example, the more optimistic philosopher A. Rosenberg (1995) pointed out, philosophy has always addressed the questions that the sciences cannot answer, such as what ought to be the case as opposed to what is, as well as the epistemological questions concerning why science cannot answer them. These musings concern questions like “What is the right thing
to do in this situation?,” “How should I live my life, in general?,” “What ought she have done then?” Attempts to provide systematic answers to these questions by defining right and wrong or good and evil and justifying rationally what one should or ought to do constitute the substantive matter of ethics or moral philosophy. This is referred to as normative ethics.2
