ABSTRACT
Quintilian writes: “Athens, the wisest of all states, regarded pity not merely as an emotion, but even as a god” (5.11.38). Although the social dimension of this apotheosis of pity is not entirely clear, a few recent studies of ancient Greek literature and culture have shown an interest in the role of pity (or more properly, eleos and oiktos) in the cultivation of ethical, social, and political values in the Greek polls (Crotty; Salkever; Zak). Such studies usually associate the experience of tragic katbarsis in Aristotelian poetics (where pity plays a major role)1 with a kind of learning that corresponds to the political education of the demos.2 Some of these scholars have been influenced by Leon Golden’s interpretation of katbarsis, which defines it as a form of intellectual clarification (Golden, Aristotle; Golden, “Clarification Theory”), rather than medical or moral purgation. Martha Nussbaum has modified Golden’s argument somewhat by saying that katbarsis is not a purely cognitive process, but one that also involves a kind of emotional clarification (Nussbaum, fragility of Goodness, 383-91).3 Nussbaum has taken the idea a step further, suggesting that Greek conceptions of pity in drama are useful not only personally and psychologically, but that they can also inform discussions of pity and compassion in modern political and legal discourse (Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 65-66).4 At least one modern political theorist has made an even stronger appeal for incorporating ancient ideas about pity into modern discussions of public policy. C.Fred Alford, drawing extensively on the work of Nussbaum, has argued that “pity is the paradigmatic civilizing passion” (265) and his essay on the subject seeks to inaugurate a modern “dialogue of the passions” in which “a policy for pity, or a regime based upon compassion” can be formulated (277).
