ABSTRACT
In keeping with the characterization of autism as a developmental disorder, psychologists attempting to explain the condition have drawn increasingly on models from the psychology of typical development. Foremost among such accounts has been its identification as a specific deficit in the understanding of others-a deficit in “theory of mind” (see Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, and Cohen, 2000). The success of this approach in generating research into the psychology of autism is evident from the burgeoning literature of the field. Yet despite its undoubted effect in furthering research into autism, the theory-of-mind deficit approach, at least in its strongest form, has particular features that make it an interesting case study of the ways in which aspects of a theory may hinder rather than help our understanding of the phenomenon we are trying to explain. Conceptualizing the problem of autism as being limited specifically to mental states risks marginalizing other, similarly disabling difficulties faced by individuals with the condition. Moreover, encapsulating the problem within a dedicated psychological or neuropsychological system risks playing down developmental considerations whereby different patterns of adaptation emerge over time. It is possible to take another perspective on the behavioral-adaptive end point we call autism by viewing it as an emergent result of a range of psychological processes, none of which is specific to either mental state understanding or to autism. Such an account need not reject the obvious truth that individuals with autism experience difficulties with the socially constructed world. But it has the potential advantage of offering explanations of their difficulties that go beyond social understanding.
