ABSTRACT
Every theory of behavior must assume that organisms are capable of responding appropriately to (i.e., recognizing) at least some stimuli. Such behavior implies the existence of brain activities corresponding to external events. The philosophical debate as to whether these representations must be learned, or are innate, has persisted for centuries. After a long period during which most psychologists leaned toward the empiricist view that all recognitions are learned (Locke, 1700/1959), a less radical position is now rapidly gaining favor in the light of evidence from recent neuroanatomical and neuropsychological research (Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Maisog, & Haxby, 1997; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Kanwisher, Weinrib, Tong, & Nakayama, 1997; Suzuki, Fiorani, & Desimone, 1997; Ungerleider, 1995; Van Essen & Maunsell, 1983) and the impressive advances in genetics and molecular biology reviewed by B.Milner, Squire, and Kandel (1998).
