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for the provision of one good may be greater than for other goods. This is exactly the case with lighthouses. Instead of a dichotomy between private and government provision, we might imagine a continuum between the poles of pure private provision with no government support to full governmental provision out of general revenues. In the case of lighthouses, it might include these different points: (1) private provision with no government enforcement of property or contract rights; (2) private provision with government enforcement of property and contract rights only; (3) private provision with government fixing rates, granting monopolies, and enforcing collection of specified user levies; (4) government provision from collection of specified user levies; and (5) government provision from general revenues. In fact, the lighthouses that have existed fall into categories 3, 4, or 5. They existed because the government was able to provide a feasible technology to address the excludability and small-numbers problem. Those problems did not necessitate that the government "own" the lighthouses or provide lighthouse services out of general revenues as some economists suggest. As Coase points out, many lighthouses were "owned" by private individuals in the sense that private individuals sup-plied the capital to build the lighthouse. Moreover, it may have been, as Coase infers, that private ownership enjoyed a decided advantage over government ownership (whether of category 4 or 5) in reducing adminis-trative costs. There are, however, no examples of lighthouses operating
DOI link for for the provision of one good may be greater than for other goods. This is exactly the case with lighthouses. Instead of a dichotomy between private and government provision, we might imagine a continuum between the poles of pure private provision with no government support to full governmental provision out of general revenues. In the case of lighthouses, it might include these different points: (1) private provision with no government enforcement of property or contract rights; (2) private provision with government enforcement of property and contract rights only; (3) private provision with government fixing rates, granting monopolies, and enforcing collection of specified user levies; (4) government provision from collection of specified user levies; and (5) government provision from general revenues. In fact, the lighthouses that have existed fall into categories 3, 4, or 5. They existed because the government was able to provide a feasible technology to address the excludability and small-numbers problem. Those problems did not necessitate that the government "own" the lighthouses or provide lighthouse services out of general revenues as some economists suggest. As Coase points out, many lighthouses were "owned" by private individuals in the sense that private individuals sup-plied the capital to build the lighthouse. Moreover, it may have been, as Coase infers, that private ownership enjoyed a decided advantage over government ownership (whether of category 4 or 5) in reducing adminis-trative costs. There are, however, no examples of lighthouses operating
for the provision of one good may be greater than for other goods. This is exactly the case with lighthouses. Instead of a dichotomy between private and government provision, we might imagine a continuum between the poles of pure private provision with no government support to full governmental provision out of general revenues. In the case of lighthouses, it might include these different points: (1) private provision with no government enforcement of property or contract rights; (2) private provision with government enforcement of property and contract rights only; (3) private provision with government fixing rates, granting monopolies, and enforcing collection of specified user levies; (4) government provision from collection of specified user levies; and (5) government provision from general revenues. In fact, the lighthouses that have existed fall into categories 3, 4, or 5. They existed because the government was able to provide a feasible technology to address the excludability and small-numbers problem. Those problems did not necessitate that the government "own" the lighthouses or provide lighthouse services out of general revenues as some economists suggest. As Coase points out, many lighthouses were "owned" by private individuals in the sense that private individuals sup-plied the capital to build the lighthouse. Moreover, it may have been, as Coase infers, that private ownership enjoyed a decided advantage over government ownership (whether of category 4 or 5) in reducing adminis-trative costs. There are, however, no examples of lighthouses operating
ABSTRACT
56 T H E J O U R N A L OF L E G A L STUDIES