ABSTRACT
In the 1960s, Hirst’s and Bruner’s claims that the ‘central ideas’, ‘concepts’ or fundamentals of a subject could be taught to students, coupled with Bloom’s taxonomies of cognitive skills and abilities, led to an increased interest in the nature of history as a discipline and in questions of what could or should be taught. History educators wrote not only of historical knowledge, understanding, reasoning and judgement, but also of empathy. Empathy, it was claimed, would help students to recognize and appreciate others’ ideas and values, and thus contribute to their moral development (see e.g. Schools Council, 1975; Shemilt, 1980; Thompson, 1986). That empathy was considered part of the historian’s craft was counter-intuitive to others, however, for the concept is commonly associated with fantasy and the emotions (Beattie, 1987; Deuchar, 1987; Skidelsky, 1988; Kedourie, 1988). Furthermore, it was argued that empathy was simply ‘unteachable’ and ‘unassessable’ (Gibson, 1969; Portal, 1987; McGovern, 1988; Lawlor, 1989; Low-Beer, 1989). Despite decades of debate, the concept of empathy is still little understood. In the discussion that follows, I should like to examine, first, whether empathy can give us access to others’ ideas and values and second, what ethical issues arise from its use in history education.
