ABSTRACT
One of the interests of comparative studies is the manner in which features mistakenly assumed to be essential are often shown to be merely accidental. Similarly, one of the characteristic features of philosophy is that it often calls into question our complacent presuppositions. Thus comparative philosophy can be doubly illuminating in this way. This paper explores a topic in comparative ethics. It seems that certain familiar oppositions in Western ethical theory (as, for instance, between egoism and altruism, or intentionalism and consequentialism) do not figure in Buddhist ethics. 1 I shall discuss two such examples, arguing that the reason why this is so in these cases is the presence of certain distinctive metaphysical presuppositions. The interest of the discussion is twofold. Firstly, it shows that such oppositions are by no means essential to an ethical system. Secondly, it illustrates the way in which metaphysical and ethical theses so often interpenetrate each other. Finally, I should remark that my discussion is supposed to be a general account of these aspects of Buddhist ethics. However, I do usually have the Theravādin tradition in mind first, and then try to extend my claims, mutatis mutandis, to cover the Mahāyāna tradition as well.
