ABSTRACT
In Chapter 8, we defended the idea that an emotion is justified if, and only if, the properties the subject is aware of thanks to the cognitive base of his emotion constitute an instance of the evaluative property that features in its correctness conditions. To develop this account, we focused exclusively on those answers to why-questions about the emotions that connect with their cognitive bases, that is, the perceptions, memories, beliefs, etc. that explain why the subject experiences a given emotion. We saw, however, that answers involving cognitive bases provide only part of the explanation of why emotions occur: what we have called motivational states should also be counted amongst the determinants of emotional responses. My disappointment at the ice-cream vendor’s answer only makes sense given my desire to try the fior di latte flavor (desire), my anger at the store manager should be explained by my grumpiness (mood), my shame by the fact that I am attached to privacy (character trait), and my pride at this little girl winning the prize becomes clear upon learning that she is my beloved niece (sentiment). This chapter has two main aims. The first is to describe these different
motivational states and to understand their roles in explanations of the emotions. We shall argue that explaining emotions in terms of moods and temperaments is tantamount to providing arational explanations for their occurrence. For this reason, explanations that proceed in these terms serve to point to the unjustified character of the emotion. Explanations of emotions in terms of character traits, sentiments, and desires are, by contrast, largely rational in the sense that they serve to locate an emotion within the subject’s broader evaluative perspective. This is true even though appeal to these states also sometimes serves to question the justification of the emotions thereby explained. Our second aim will then consist in measuring more generally the epistemological impact, negative and positive, of these motivational states on the emotions. Regarding their negative impact, we shall offer reasons to think that even if motivational states sometimes have a distorting effect on our emotions, this is no reason to abandon the account we have defended in Chapter 8. Regarding their positive role, we shall present and offer reasons to reject two views according to which motivational states are justificatory reasons for the emotions they explain, in that way securing the view of justified emotions we have put forward. On the whole, this chapter will then
emphasize the contrast between the reasons that merely explain why one has an emotion and the justificatory reasons for this emotion.
