ABSTRACT

Exactly 50 years ago, the newly installed Eisenhower administration began a systematic process of rethinking national security strategy. To be sure, the Truman Doctrine of containment of Soviet aggression continued to be relevant. But Eisenhower and many of his advisors were convinced that the onset of the nuclear age implied profound changes for security affairs. Beginning with the secretive 'Project Solarium',1 and continuing in more open and formal review processes, an attempt was made to imbue the containment process with new energy and muscle. Nuclear weapons were quickly seen as the catalysts for remarkable politico-military changes. For example, any communist aggression was to be opposed by 'massive retaliation', a threat to respond even to conventional attacks with nuclear weapons. The Army was to have a 'New Look'; i.e. it was to shed much of its traditional weaponry in favour of heavy reliance on nuclear arms. Both initiatives were in deep trouble from the very outset, but both took years to die before the inescapable truth of mutual assured destruction asserted itself.2 It is something of a cautionary tale.