ABSTRACT
Martin Hollis acknowledged a far wider role for the political arts than many philosophers. He appreciated how in practical life ‘the best’ was frequently ‘the enemy of the good’, with compromise no bad thing (Bellamy & Hollis 1998). A paragon of civic virtue, he also thought societies functioned well only when people manifested a solidarity with others and were prepared to make sacrifices for the common good. Thus, he saw democratic politics as a useful way of tailoring moral principles to the requirements of particular circumstances, and of generating the collective agreements needed to support those public goods on which personal well-being often depends. Yet, he believed democracy had to be infused with a high degree of morality to achieve these results. Otherwise, he feared majorities could turn tyrannous and individuals be apt to free-ride or selectively defect whenever their civic obligations appeared onerous. Purely political accounts of justice as the product of a democratic procedure risked confusing might with right, with the concern and respect due to all individuals to pursue their own good in their own way descending into the unedifying (and ultimately self-defeating) spectacle of each for him (or her) self (Bellamy & Hollis 1995).
