ABSTRACT
Trusting in Reason PRESTON KING The claims of reason, whether descriptive or prescriptive, should be
viewed as universal. There are different ways and methods designed to enable a grasp of rationality, but there is no coherent way of designing escape from rationality. Ethics no more collapses into science than science collapses into ethics. Hence the logic of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ diverge, but without prejudice to the rationality of either. Moral theory as distinct from scientific theory is often perceived to be irrational (hence emotivists, naturalists and relativists). An important dimension of this supposed irrationality lies in the characterisation of universalism as antipluralist, and of pluralism as relativism. One good reason why this characterisation fails is because the contradictory of pluralism is absolutism, not universalism, and because pluralism contains significant claims that prove both coherent and apt, morally and politically.
