ABSTRACT
The previous chapter has demonstrated how the superiority of Napoleon’s operational art resulted in the crushing defeat of the Prussian army. This chapter will discuss the impact of the Prussian reforms from 1807 to 1813 on the evolution of operational art. It will be shown how civil reforms and military reforms, reinforcing each other, created conditions, such as meritocracy and the socio-political conditions for a mass army, in which the operational instruments-army corps and a staff system as well as a highly trained officer corps-could be forged. First efforts in the field of operational theory will also be discussed. Throughout the chapter, parallels between the French reforms after the Seven Years’ War and the Prussian reforms will be drawn. Likewise, the interplay between theory and practice, reinforced by the experience of 1806, as well as the interrelation between military and non-military developments will be a recurrent theme.
