ABSTRACT
The Ankara meeting of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council in January 1958 took place against a background of mounting concern at the prospect of an imminent union between Egypt and Syria. After the Suez crisis, Nasser had resumed his forward policy in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in order to keep these countries away from the Baghdad Pact and, if possible, to form a union with Syria. The concept of an Egyptian-Syrian union had become an active issue shortly after the conclusion of the Egyptian-Syrian military pact in October 1955. Enthusiasm for union was then confined essentially to Syria, and since then the campaign for union had been periodically revived in the Syrian parliament. Although, in November 1957, a Syrian initiative led to the adoption of a joint resolution by the Egyptian and Syrian parliaments declaring support for the principle of federal union, Nasser did not take it seriously. He delayed serious consideration of union until he might consolidate his influence in Syria completely.1
