ABSTRACT
In the early 1950s, British strategic planning for a possible war against the Soviet bloc distinguished between short-term and long-term goals. It was expected that the Cold War would continue for a long time, with periods of ‘greater and lesser tension’. The goals of the two opposing camps remained in conflict, and no change was forseen. But for the short term, it was believed that the Soviets wanted to avoid a ‘hot’ war, and would not deliberately initiate a global conflict. This prognosis would pertain for so long as the Soviets felt themselves to be vulnerable to nuclear attack by the Allies, but had not yet developed their own heavy bomber force, able strike back effectively against the continental United States. Nevertheless, given the fundamental ideological differences between the sides, war was always a possibility, which might result from either a miscalculation of the ‘political or strategic risks, or [an] accident, contrary to the present intentions of either side’.2
