ABSTRACT
A correct assessment of Malta's contribution to the North African campaigns of late 1942 and early 1943 must take account of the difficulties that confronted the authorities on the island after the heavy air attacks in March and April 1942. Although the RAF had, by the end of May, regained local air superiority, it was to be several months before the island's offensive power could be restored. There were two principal reasons for this. First, the island continued to be short of food for the civil and military population, and of fuel and military supplies to maintain its defensive and offensive capabilities. Second, the need to protect successive relief convoys at times diverted resources from offensive operations, and at the beginning of the ‘Torch’ campaign this had unfortunate consequences. The limitations imposed by these factors, and the consequent choices forced upon the authorities in London, Valletta and Cairo, provide the strategic framework within which Maltese offensive operations were only slowly re-established.
