ABSTRACT
Despite the difficulties which Scotland faced over the structural Funds, that did not deter a growing number of Scottish interests from developing their own links with the EU. When the Europeanisation of Scottish institutions and organisations neared its climax in the aftermath of the SEA, it seemed for a moment that the UK government risked losing its status as gatekeeper. Whilst it is tempting to believe that there really was such a thing as a Westminster by-pass,1 the actuality was rather more modest. On the one hand, Scottish interests could, and did, join pan-EU pressure groups and lobby MEPs, the CoR, other Member States’ governments and the Commission with varying degrees of success. But few ignored the UK government entirely. In part this was because of its potential influence in the Council. It was also because the government was responsible for overseeing the implementation of EU policy within the UK. For the most part, however, EU affairs remained the preserve of the lead2 departments in London. The Scottish Office, as a territorial branch of the UK government was responsible for aggregating Scottish interests in relation to a particular EU proposal and then transmitting this upwards to whichever lead department was responsible for representing the UK in relation to the policy in question. Whilst the Scottish Office clearly underwent Europeanisation, the notion that it pursued a form of para-diplomacy is less tenable by virtue of its status. That is to say that its foreign affairs’ agenda was largely subsumed within that of the UK government. Some of its officials were seconded to UKRep and no doubt many others participated in the Council’s
working groups as a part of the UK delegation. As a consequence, if any paradiplomacy did actually occur this would be most likely to be pursued by Scotland’s regional councils3 and Scotland Europa in Brussels. But whether their activities really amounted to para-diplomacy in practice is open to question.
