ABSTRACT
As with March 1918, this volume of the Official History series covered one of the more contentious of the Great War’s battles. In order to provide a comprehensive and historically legitimate account this work would have to deal with major and controversial issues surrounding Haig’s strategic vision and tactical responsibility. Strategically, what was Haig’s motivation for fighting this offensive and for continuing to fight it once the appalling weather conditions had all but precluded any chance of success? Haig subsequently claimed that he was driven on by his own private knowledge of the mutinous state of the French army and by the appeals of Pétain. Furthermore, did Haig intend the action as a decisive breakthrough or, as he subsequently contended, as a step-by-step advance as part of a steady process of wearing down the German army? Did the tactical preparations for the advance support this strategy and, importantly, to what extent did they draw on lessons of previous tactical success? The work would have to consider how successfully Haig was able to communicate both his strategic intentions and his tactical direction to his army commanders, and, indeed, the degree to which Haig himself, as opposed to these commanders, assumed tactical responsibility. The extent to which Edmonds was able to raise and answer these questions, and the degree to which these conclusions stand up to the scrutiny of current research, will be considered in due course.
