ABSTRACT
The Royal Navy’s strategy to retake the Falkland Islands was unsurprising when viewed through a cultural filter. It reflected a predilection toward very old and well-tested beliefs that had proven successful in wars and battles in the past. This distinctive approach to warfare in the cold waters of the South Atlantic Ocean, wittingly and unwittingly, revealed an enormous amount about the significance of institutional culture in the Royal Navy. The desire for a decisive battle, albeit unarticulated, remained a very important strand in the construction of a viable strategy to destroy the Argentinian Navy. The symbolism of the ‘capital’ surface ship was mirrored in the role of aircraft carriers in the South Atlantic, which were at the forefront of the entire operation and dominated every stage of operations. In addition, the Falklands Conflict also demonstrated how institutional culture could create friction in warfare. Subcultural affiliation at times hindered rather than helped certain operations. Conflicts of belief about the application of new technologies like nuclear-powered submarines confounded the possibility of a truly decisive battle with the Argentine Navy; it also reduced the sinking of the Belgrano from a co-ordinated strike to a desperate plea for action from a besieged Admiral in the South Atlantic.
