ABSTRACT
It is sometimes suggested that colonial issues were rarely the subject of controversy or even interest in British domestic politics after 1945. Nevertheless, British policies in Africa and the Middle East did occasionally spark heated debates in Parliament and the press: Palestine, Suez, Biafra and Rhodesia still have resonance even if the details of the events which made them headline news have been forgotten. The case of Aden is somewhat different for, although it generated a significant degree of public interest during the 1960s, the episode appears to have faded almost entirely from the popular memory. By contrast, those British officials who were personally involved in the end of British rule in Aden and the Protectorates retained an interest in the affairs of the region and, for them, the decisions made by the Wilson government generated an almost unprecedented degree of bitterness. The Labour government was charged by its critics with causing unnecessary loss of life and of carelessly throwing away British prestige by the decision embodied in the February 1966 Defence White Paper to abandon its defence commitment to Aden and the Protectorates at independence. J.B.Kelly later described it as ‘a betrayal of all past undertakings, a betrayal of the trust placed in British steadfastness, a renunciation of an imperial power’s recognised responsibilities to its subjects.’1 Responding to Kelly’s criticisms, Thomas Mockaitis pointed to the legacy which the Wilson government had inherited from their Conservative predecessors: an unpopular federation dominated by tribal leaders and an unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaign.2 There is substance to both the Kelly and Mockaitis positions: the Conservatives did build a gimcrack political system with a narrow base of support and the Labour government’s decision to suddenly retract the offer of defence assistance did impair efforts to achieve a political resolution. Policy-makers in Britain eventually acknowledged this latter problem and an examination of the post-February 1966 period suggests that they retreated on the policy of decisively cutting commitments. The further deterioration of the security situation in Aden after this date, which was aggravated by the decision to abandon the base, eventually precipitated an even hastier withdrawal than that envisaged in February 1966. Consideration of these controversies forms a necessary prelude to a discussion of the impact of the Defence White Paper on the ground in southwest Arabia in the first half of this chapter; the second half examines the escalating urban insurrection in Aden, the overthrow of the rulers in the interior and the last minute negotiations which preceded Britain’s exit in November 1967.
