ABSTRACT
While there is a large body of recent work devoted to the production (or destruction) of philosophical analyses of concepts such as knowledge and causation, the concept of substance has been neglected in comparison. (p. 6)
Whereas it is good to see an 'ontological turn' also featuring in analytic philosophy, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz's starting point needs to be questioned. O f course, we all believe in 'continuants such as people, rocks, flowers, and houses'; but are we really committed to a claim about independent 'substances' when we hold such beliefs? A t various key points in their argument, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz appeal to an 'intuitive' notion of a substance as a counter to those who do not see 'substance' as an independent entity. (See, for example, pp. 59,63.) H o w - ever, as I also suggested in chapter 3, looked at closely 'common sense' can include grossly divergent experiential reports about the relationship between 'self and 'other', and is not as philosophically homogeneous - or as secure - as it might at first sight seem. Thus, as I oudined in chapter 1, 'common sense' - and the 'folk' conceptual scheme - has difficulties in dealing with birth and growth.
