ABSTRACT
THE CONCLUSION of an interim settlement for the future regime of the Suez Canal had taken place against the background of a series of reversals for Nasser’s regime in the Middle East. The most important of these reversals was the overthrow of the pro-Nasser, parliamentary government in Jordan in April 1957. Prior to Suez, Jordan had been one of Britain’s closest regional allies, but, by the beginning of 1957, King Hussein, under pressure from his proNasser Prime Minister, Nabulsi, agreed to align Jordan with Nasser’s Arab Solidarity Pact. This pact, signed in January 1957, created a military alliance between Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. As a consequence of Suez and their adherence to this pact, the Jordanians wished to abrogate the military alliance with Britain. The alliance allowed the latter to station troops in Jordan, but also as we have seen entailed an obligation to come to Jordan’s assistance if it were attacked. The British Cabinet was certain by the end of 1956 that a proWestern government could not be preserved in Jordan. Consequently, they saw the abrogation of the treaty as recognition of political reality rather than a further setback after Suez. When Dulles questioned Lloyd on the future of Jordan in December 1956, the latter replied, ‘I don’t think it’s got one.’1
