ABSTRACT
With the proclamation of the new State and the subsequent hostilities, the United States acted to apply the 23 April Security Council’s call for a cease-fire-which was originally aimed at stopping the JewishPalestinian fighting-to the now developing Israeli-Arab front. The UN General Assembly adopted the American proposal, and called for the appointment of a mediator who would act to restore the peace in Palestine, and the Swedish Count, Folke Bernadotte, was appointed on 20 May.1 The Arab leaders found it hard to make a decision, wavering between domestic considerations, anxiety over international reaction, fear of defeat and the ensuing repercussions, and possibly sincere concern over the fate of Palestine. The diversity of opinions and possibilities emerged during the 25 May Political Committee of the Arab League session, where the matter was discussed. The Regent of Iraq was against the cease-fire because he thought that accepting it would imply an admission of defeat. The Regent’s position was also influenced by the opposition of the Iraqi generals to the cease-fire, as they had so far no achievements to show. The Egyptian delegation was also against accepting the cease-fire, arguing that only the Jews would gain from a ceasefire, as ‘unless someone prevented arms and reinforcement from reaching the Jews (and there was no one to do so) the cease-fire would be to the detriment of the Arabs’. The Arab League’s General Secretary agreed with the Egyptians.2 Only the Jordanian Prime Minister was in favor of a cease-fire. He rejected the Egyptian arguments, claiming that in neither case would it be possible to prevent the Jews receiving arms and reinforcements as, at this time, it did not seem probable that the Arab forces would capture Tel Aviv, as the Egyptian Army refused to move beyond its current position and the Jews had contained the Lebanese and Syrian advances. Also, the only active force was the Arab
Legion, and therefore ‘if things turned against the Arabs it was clear that Transjordan and its army would be the principal sufferer’.3
