ABSTRACT
While the politicians were pondering the next stage, the Israeli and Egyptian military commanders were making preparations for the renewal of hostilities. Despite Ben-Gurion’s decision to give low priority to the fighting in the Negev-planning to turn to it only after the successful conclusion of the operations on the Jordanian front-his generals drew up a plan of battle that was far more ambitious than BenGurion had urged. The General Staff ’s aim was to launch ‘a comprehensive offensive on the invading enemy forces [that is, the Egyptians] in order to push them outside the country’s borders’.1 The actual plan, ‘Operation AnFar’ (Anti-Farouk), which was worked out between the 5th Brigade and the General Staff, was far less ambitious. Shimon Avidan, Givati’s commander, drew up his plans on the assumption that he would not get any more troops, following the decision by the leadership not to focus on the south at this stage. Avidan also had to take into account that he would have to commit some of his forces to defending settlements located outside the sector where his troops were to do battle; and that the Egyptians’ deployment enabled them to attack from various points. He therefore prepared a plan with an emphasis on defense: points of possible penetration by the Egyptians were to be manned by defending forces, while the remainder of the brigade was given local offensive missions. Two of the Givati Brigade’s battalions were to be deployed defensively around Jewish population centers in the brigade sector,2
another battalion would cleanse the brigade’s eastern sector of an Arab concentration in the al-Masmiyya-Tall al-Sa-fi area, while a third battalion would assist the 12th Brigade in its mission to dislodge the Egyptians from Iraq Suwaydan and open the road to the Negev.3
