ABSTRACT
IN ITS CONSTANT QUEST for Western allies and an arms supply, Israel also looked towards Britain. Yet the relations between the two countries were complicated by past experience. The formal British attitude towards Israel was based on the fact that ‘A Jewish state in Palestine was brought into being in accordance with the will of the United Nations General Assembly’ Britain did not vote for the 1947 resolution but promised to ‘respect the wishes of the majority of member nations’.1 Britain had given Israel de facto recognition only after five aircraft flying over Israeli-Egyptian territory had been shot down by the Israelis, and only extended de jure recognition after the armistice lines were signed and King Abdullah of Jordan had formally annexed the West Bank.2 British policy towards Israel after this was shaped by its general attitude towards the Middle East, which was centred around the regional defence system between Britain and the Arab states. In this context, Israel had very little significance for Britain other than as a potential obstacle to British interests.3 Israel had little strategic or economic importance for Britain. It had no oil resources and it was not close to borders with the Soviet Union, which had to be defended. Israel could not provide the British with any strategic advantage they needed and did not have already. Furthermore, the Foreign Office believed that ‘Israel by the mere fact of her existence represents a constant threat to our economic and strategic interests in the Middle East.’4 Therefore any alliance with Israel risked Britain’s friendship with certain Arab countries, co-operation with whom was much more essential than any link with Israel.5
