ABSTRACT
THE CAMPAIGN ONE MINUTE BEFORE 5 p.m. on 29 October Israeli parachute battalions were dropped near the Mitla pass. By 5.30 p.m. they were already advancing towards Colonel Parker’s gravestone and by 7 p.m. an IDF spokesman announced that Israeli forces had secured positions west of Nakhl near the Suez Canal.1 Towards dawn on 31 October, the Israelis waited nervously to see the French and British air bombardment on the Egyptian airfields. But at noon a cable from Yosef Nachmias, the Israeli Defence Ministry representative in Paris, explained that the British had decided to delay the bombing because their aircraft were facing strong anti-aircraft fire as well as hostile and highly manoeuvrable reconnaissance jets. This incident aroused Britain’s suspicions that the Egyptians were being assisted by Soviet pilots and they therefore decided not to take the risk of attacking in daylight.2 However, the real reason behind the delay, according to BarOn, was that the military commanders were not consulted prior to the operation and they disputed the order to attack in daylight because they believed it was too risky and irrational.3
