ABSTRACT
During the course of May confidence that the naval threat was under control grew. Optimism on the air threat was much scarcer, especially among those who might be on the receiving end. The concern in the South Atlantic was that, having accepted air superiority as an essential precondition for a landing, Northwood and the Chiefs were now taking a more relaxed view. In a 1949Z signal on 6 May, Thompson told Moore that he had always understood that there was a ‘firm concept…that sea and air battle must be won first before amphibious landing. Indeed recall these words used at meeting with CINC in Hermes.’ If these conditions could not be met, Thompson felt that a landing should not be attempted ‘unless we wish to risk losing large part of Brigade, possibly before we get ashore’. Thompson forcefully conveyed the fact that: ‘Unpalatable though it may be, fact must be faced that amphibious operations cannot be successfully carried out in hostile air environment. This is not a new thought’.
