ABSTRACT
After the landing these issues took up the bulk of Prime Ministerial time. Her files contain few discussions of rules of engagement or other military issues. On these matters she was now very much in the hands of the military. Instead they are full of reports from overseas embassies, telling of expressions of concern and anxiety, proposals for diplomatic initiatives and calls for generosity, extracts from newspaper editorials and conversations with opinion formers. From the point of landing, after which few governments appeared to harbour any thoughts of possible British defeat, the pressure for moderation grew palpably. It explains why the wait from the landing to Goose Green seemed interminable in Whitehall: how could Britain accede to calls for a cease-fire when there was no fire to cease except over San Carlos? Until now the Government had gone along with international concerns by offering compromises that would have caused real political difficulty at home had they been accepted by Argentina-and might not have been offered at all had such acceptance been likely. In the end the effort had been worthwhile for Britain because, although the aggrieved party, it appeared to have been more ready to compromise than the aggressor. The risk as the Junta contemplated the possibility of defeat was that they might soften their diplomatic position. For the same reason the British Government began to harden its own. As the land battle began in earnest the Government could not contemplate putting at risk gains achieved at such a high human cost on the basis of what they deemed to be a highly dubious political analysis of the detrimental effects of a decisive victory.
