ABSTRACT
Getting 5 Infantry Brigade into position was proving to be a prolonged and painful process. From the point when its deployment to the South Atlantic had been first mooted its position had been problematic. It had been cobbled together after losing the two parachute battalions, and almost the Gurkhas because of the political sensitivities believed to be associated with their use. The addition of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Welsh Guards was controversial because they had come from public duties (although the Welsh Guards had recently had a tour in Northern Ireland). One officer in the Scots Guards later recalled that his men had focussed their training on the two crucial areas of shooting and fitness. 1 Another later observed that though the men were fit ‘tactics were very rusty.’ 2 To raise levels of fitness and to weld the Brigade together as a coherent fighting unit they were sent off to Wales for exercises, which were conducted at the platoon and company rather than battalion level. The results were not encouraging. With so many units that had never worked together before the disjointed performance was not surprising. Nonetheless it led to questions being raised about the suitability of Brigadier Tony Wilson, although not sufficiently to alter the normal reluctance to change a commander at such a critical time. Brigadier John Waters went on the QEII to serve as Moore’s deputy but also as a possible replacement Brigade Commander should a need arise. He was already the reserve commander for 5 Infantry Brigade. As Moore’s deputy he would be able to take the lead on crucial but timeconsuming issues involving logistics and prisoners and, should something happen to Moore, take over his role. The Gurkhas were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel David Morgan, the Welsh Guards by Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Rickett and the Scots Guards by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Scott.
