ABSTRACT
The political momentum created by the decision to send the Task Force and the enthusiastic national backing that it had received swept up officials and officers alike, no longer advising on the wisdom of setting a challenging strategic objective but obliged instead to work out how it could be met. The doubts and uncertainties could not, however, be wholly suppressed. The basic operational requirements were clear enough: Argentine forces on the Falklands would have to be cut off from the mainland; then naval and air supremacy would have to be established; lastly, if possible, a force would have to be landed in order to move to retake Stanley. Each step seemed fraught: the logistical issues nightmarish. Lesser options, from covert operations to a partial blockade and occasional attacks on Argentine vessels by SSNs did not change the big picture. Politics added further complications. The UK depended on international support not only in its diplomatic efforts but also in logistics and material support. So even if a military conclusion was assumed, the political dimension could not be disregarded. Some actions might therefore have to be eschewed because their political impact would outweigh their military impact. Early in the discussions, the Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong, identified for the Prime Minister examples of such actions, of which the most obvious was directing British military power in some way against the Argentine mainland, with air raids against military targets, such as airbases, ships in harbour, military infrastructure, or even civil targets. Such operations would not only be politically unacceptable but also unusually demanding, not least because they would require the carriers, and their escorts, getting into positions well in range of Argentine forces. Similar problems would accompany an attempt to impose a full blockade of Argentina.
