ABSTRACT
As early as 14 April, when various communications suggested that the Haig mission was on the verge of failure, the FCO Planning Staff warned that any other negotiating method would be less favourable to Britain and so if Haig appeared to be about to give up, ‘our first priority should be to try to persuade him not to do so.’ This was so even if it required coming up with serious new proposals on the substance, for example a revival of leaseback, or the process, such as proximity talks with Costa Mendez and Pym. There was no reason to suppose that anybody else-a respected international figure, a group of states, or a special representative of the UN-could be more successful in mediation. Arbitration, such as a commission appointed by the Security Council, carried the obvious risk of a finding against Britain, especially if it included a large third world component. An even more legally binding process, such as a referral to the ICJ carried the same risk. Of all the options this was probably the most favoured-because of the interest among some of the European allies, the presentational advantages in terms of showing a willingness to get a solution, as well as simplicity and maximum impact.
