ABSTRACT
From this point events started to take on a more dynamic quality as the two forces engaged with each other. It is important to recognise that the same events could be interpreted in quite different ways from the distinctive national vantage points. The Argentine take on the events of 1 May varied considerably from that of the British. Unlike the British they knew that the damage to Stanley airfield was limited. They also believed that their air defences had shot down two Harriers during the dawn raids, and that they had inflicted serious damage on at least one warship. Woodward’s ruse had therefore worked so well that when his units began to withdraw this was assumed by Argentine commanders to represent something of a British failure. A serious landing had been attempted to establish some sort of presence on the Islands but the attempt had been abandoned. If there had not been technical problems-with the San Luis’s torpedoes and the refuelling of Exocet-armed Super Etendards-they would have been able to achieve even more. 1
As British ships moved away from around the Falklands, Argentine naval units sought to press home what they thought was an advantage and inflict more damage upon them. The carrier was much further east than Splendid had been led to expect, involved now in the search for the British fleet. During the evening of 1 May Admiral Allara was gearing up to mount his attack. He felt he understood where the British were and what they were up to. His Tracker aircraft had picked up signs of British warships 120 miles away as a result of aerial reconnaissance and he was aware of the reports from the Falklands of attempted British landings. Admiral Lombardo, Commander South Atlantic, had given him new rules of engagement, allowing for attacks on the British fleet without restriction. He moved towards the Task Force and, at 2007 local time (2307Z) ordered the initiation of offensive operations.
