ABSTRACT
One of the most controversial of all questions relating to the Falklands Campaign was the degree to which Britain benefited from close co-operation with Chile. This question became particularly salient during 1999 when General Augusto Pinochet, who had been Chilean leader at the time of the Falklands, was arrested in London on the basis of a request from Spain for his extradition to face trial for crimes against humanity. Baroness Thatcher was especially energetic in his defence, not least because of his support for Britain in 1982. Pinochet himself spoke of how:
When Argentine forces occupied the Falklands in 1982,1 instructed my government to provide, within the context of our neutrality, whatever assistance we could to our friend and ally. I considered this a matter of Chile’s national honour. 1
The logic of co-operation was clear. Both countries had territorial disputes with Argentina and in both cases Argentina was behaving in an unacceptable manner, ignoring attempts at arbitration in the case of the Beagle Channel just as it had resorted to armed force in the case of the Falklands. The main bar to overt co-operation was Chilean reluctance to contradict hemispheric solidarity and British concern about the tension between its claim to be acting on behalf of democracy and Chile’s dismal human rights record. Chile also had to reflect on Argentina’s superior military strength when assessing the risks of supporting a British military build-up. For these reasons it was inevitable that any co-operation would be covert.
