ABSTRACT
The basic objective of Curzon’s Persian policy was to prevent any rival power from gaining either a political or economic foothold in the country. In line with this policy, the Foreign Office was determined to resist any American involvement in Persia. In April 1919 when the American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, told Balfour that he might raise the issue of Persia at the Peace Conference if Britain did not, Crowe urged: “Why do we not take the bull by the horns and tell the Americans that Persia is for us covered by what is our equivalent in Asia of the Monroe doctrine: this is our preserve!”1 This summed up the attitude of the Foreign Office. So when a few months later Lord Grey, on special mission at Washington, alarmed by the vociferous objections of the Senate and the State Department to the AngloPersian Agreement, suggested that the U.S. government be allowed to participate in providing advisers and loans to Persia, Curzon brushed aside his advice.2
