ABSTRACT
But though the staff in the Colonial Office might recognize in theory the futility of trying to dictate on matters of local concern, reference to American colonies after 1763 would show that despite Merivale’s assertion its definition of ‘local’ did not always coincide with that of the colonists. At that time Great Britain had wanted to raise revenue from her dependencies; between 1830 and 1850, she
wanted to use their resources, and at both periods she was concerned to assert her legal paramountcy. Lord Grey might admit in 1853 that ‘it would undoubtedly be in the highest degree absurd to attempt to govern from Downing Street’, but like others he had often attempted to do so, and although Lord Glenelg might write in 1835, when Secretary of State, that Parliamentary legislation on any subject of exclusive internal concern to any British colony possessing a representative assembly is, as a general rule, unconstitutional’, it was unfortunate that many controversial subjects, such as land, immigration, slavery, the church establishments, and others, seemed to be not of ‘exclusive internal concern’.3 Certainly in the Australian colonies there was no elected assembly, but there was both a vocal press and powerful colonial spokesmen ready to criticize hotly policies the Governors had been told to carry out; in these circumstances, should the latter try to modify their instructions, or mollify public opinion, or do neither and obey their orders without demur? Much would depend on the character of the Governor concerned. Professor Creighton has noted that between 1818 and 1831, in the development of the dispute in Lower Canada which culminated in the risings of 1836-7, ‘five governors and one lieutenantgovernor had a hand in the solution of the financial question; their personalities, their characteristics, their blunders, and even their successes had an influence upon the development of the quarrel’; contemporaneously Stephen underlined their importance on the one hand when he criticized, in 1829, the ‘very indiscreet use of the power of the Executive’, and on the other, when on the eve of the rebellion, he declared that, ‘a resolute stand by a resolute man a few weeks ago would have subdued this violence… To see such a game lost merely from the want of one vigorous effort made in due time would indeed be enough to put to flight the patience of Job himself’.4
