ABSTRACT
The Mediterranean world knew many forms of informal naval violence ranging from straightforward piracy to a variety of legalized or quasilegal activities involving reprisals, privateering and corsairing. 1 The type of corso which developed on Rhodes during the fifteenth century was officially licensed by an established authority, the Master of the Hospital, and was limited, in theory at least though often not in practice, to attacks on infidel enemies of the religious order state settled on Rhodes. Such activities fitted into an existing pattern. In the thirteenth century there were already forms of guerra di corso in which individuals operated under public control with a licence to attack enemies of the state. Such arrangements may have grown out of permits allowing injured parties to seek indemnities from those who had damaged them, or simply from agreements by which authorities lent vessels to individuals and sometimes financed them. The corsairs had to present fidejussores who would guarantee their proper conduct and to promise not to attack subjects or friends of their own state; they were to hand over a portion, often a fifth, of their booty. To profit from this system there emerged professional groups who took high risks and stood to make very considerable gains. The armament of corsair expeditions involved formal notarized contracts and the raising of capital through shares. After expenses had been deducted, profits were divided between the investors, those who played an active role at sea normally receiving a higher return than those who merely provided finance; officers and crews also received shares. Public legislation supposedly controlled such activities, but it could be extremely difficult to prevent corsairs from attacking friendly shipping or seizing the merchandise of third parties. 2
