ABSTRACT
Introduction: dharma, devolution, and Dutugemunu Since 1995, Sri Lankans have continued to debate the devolution package proposed by the People’s Alliance (PA) government, which in effect would create regional autonomy for Tamils in the north of Sri Lanka.1 At the same time, Sri Lanka’s war between the predominantly Sinhala government and the separatist LTTE for the most part has continued unabated in the north of the island, considered by many Tamils to be their traditional homeland. In contemporary parlance, the protracted war in the north of Sri Lanka, with its cease-fires that issue only renewed fighting, is articulated as having three distinct phases, each bearing the eponymous name of the alleged homeland of the Tamils – namely, Eelam 1, Eelam 2, and Eelam 3. In the spring of 2000, more than five years after the third phase of the war began (April 19 1995), the PA government’s public position on Sri Lanka’s war continued to hinge on its promotion of a “peace package,” which included both war and devolution, the latter of which would provide Tamils (who chose to live in the north) a type of semi-autonomy. While many Sinhala Sri Lankans support the government in its war against the LTTE, many Sinhalas oppose devolution, or the de facto Tamil “state” in the north of the island. Among those who oppose devolution are the venerable Mahanayakes (leading monks) of the Sri Lankan monastic fraternities; they are particularly resistant to international mediators, including the government of Norway (which has recently played a role), as facilitators in the Sri Lankan conflict, arguing that neither foreigners nor their own (predominantly Sinhala) government realize that devolution “would be detrimental to the Sinhala people.”2 Still others comment on “the tragic irony of it … that a leader elected on a mandate for peace [Chandrika Kumaratunga] is now presiding over one of the most fierce wars to occur in the country.”3
